

5: "BEEN THERE, DONE THAT"

War stories make better reading than "to do" lists. For contacts with court staff who have "been there, done that," see the following actual case studies from jurisdictions across the country:

Fire Bombing of a California Court, 1995

Name of Court and Contact:

Chuck Wyrick, Information System and Facilities Manager
Superior Court of California, Contra-Costa County

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Description of Court:

Consolidated court system. Combination metro/rural California trial court. Total 45 judges in courthouse in county seat and four remote court sites

Description of Event:

Arson (1995) in Walnut Creek, in Concord and in Martinez, California court locations - all within 30 days.

- Molotov cocktail destroyed three judge chambers, courtrooms, law library and jury deliberation rooms in Walnut Creek court facility. Fire broke out at 5:30 a.m., was put out by 7:00 a.m. Data and voice communications were provided to an adjacent county-owned building where clerks and court operations were moved.
30 days later, same arsonists set fire to two court buildings in Concord,

where one building was completely destroyed and the other caused major damage to a portion of the building and the roof. Traffic court operations shifted to another portion of the building, requiring data lines, terminals and printers. The Criminal operations moved to the court in another city, requiring data lines, terminals and furniture.

- That same evening, the same arsonists fire-bombed the main court structure in Martinez, seven miles away. Eleven courtrooms were damaged, along with offices of the DA, Legal Research attorney and Clerk, affecting 350 staff and a damage estimate of millions of dollars. Court operations moved into multiple buildings in downtown Martinez.

Damage Control Strategy:

In each instance, the object was to resume of court business with little or no interruption in service to the public. Immediate action was taken to set up temporary work space, reroute voice and data communications to nearby locations, coordinate and organize staff in court and other departments, and assess and evaluate damage. Replacement equipment was shipped expeditiously. When furniture was unavailable, staff worked from the floor. Professionals were brought in to freeze-

dry and clean waterlogged records, preserving record integrity. Media was kept at a distance. Court and court-related agencies worked closely together.

Extent of Business Disruption:

In Walnut Creek, court operations resumed by 10:30 a.m. the same day! In Concord, business resumption in both court structures occurred within three business days. In the Martinez location, court hearings and new filings resumed within two business days.

Biggest Challenge:

The extent of smoke and water damage in not one, not two, but three court locations.

Lessons Learned:

Have a plan in place in advance, with multiple alternatives. To quote Chuck, "You have to look at your own organization's situation to determine what plans you need and how those plans should be laid out. The plan that worked for us would not necessarily work for another court."

Fire in a Rural Washington Court, 1995

Name of Court and Contact:

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Superior Court of Washington in
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Description of Court:

General jurisdiction trial court in farming community, with county population of 10,000, one judge, one elected clerk, and four employees.

Description of Event:

A juvenile set fire to the county courthouse on December 23, 1995 at 10:00 p.m. in a failed attempt to destroy records in a case before the court. The top floor of the three-story structure, containing the courtroom, the Clerk's office and the court's records, were destroyed.

Damage Control Strategy:

The object was to resume business as soon as possible, with little or no disruption in service to the public - and that occurred, with a borrowed cell phone and a computer provided by the state. Court proceedings took place at the county fairgrounds, where jurors sat on folding chairs and the heater was turned off so speakers could be heard. Clerk's Office staff had access to the court's docket and were able to accept filings and answer most questions - even while sharing space with the county sheriff.

Extent of Business Disruption:

The courthouse was a crime scene for 27 days - which meant that the court's files, safe in a vault on the destroyed third floor, were unavailable to the court or to the clerk. Even so, court took place, using copies of documents provided by attorneys. Within six weeks of the fire, the Clerk's Office was established in a mobile unit, later replaced by facilities in the basement of a restaurant. Building

reconstruction was complete within a year of the fire.

Biggest Challenge:

Doing without the files was difficult, as was having access only to the docket. It was also difficult being six blocks away from the judge, having always worked nearby.

Lessons Learned:

Since the fire, the clerk has implemented an imaging system which provides

access to the entire file with opportunity to reproduce all or a portion of it, should hard copy be unavailable.

This event points to some of the things that are being done right. For example, because the vault was large enough, and policy was followed that precludes files from outside the vault overnight, no files were burned. Even so, staff was current with state microfilming requirements and files could have been replaced had they been destroyed.

Flood and Bombing of a California Court, 1997

Name of Court and Contact:

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Superior Court of California, Solano County

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Description of Court:

Unified trial court, combining limited and general jurisdiction trial courts, hearing all case types from traffic to death penalty. Solano County has a population of 370,000, with 22 judicial officers and 240 staff in three locations. The court's main facility in Fairfield is located in two buildings. The court has a branch in Vallejo, a town with a population of 85,000.

Description of Events:

In January 1997, the Solano County Courthouse in Fairfield was flooded as the tide came in after several days of rain and the water had no place to go.

Between 5:00 and 5:30 p.m., with employees still in the building and in the parking lot, flood waters came through the parking lot behind the building, in the main entrance, and into the wing of the building containing two courtrooms, chambers and jury assembly room.

The following week, at 3:30 a.m. on a Thursday, dynamite exploded outside the court's branch office in Vallejo, 17 miles to the west, blowing glass from all the windows in the Clerk's Office into the building and causing the ceiling to drop into the building's interior. Within an hour, media was on the scene. "Urban terrorism" was the talk on CNN. Later that same morning, the Fairfield Courthouse received a bomb threat. The building was evacuated, Travis Air Force Base brought in bomb dogs, and within two hours, as the site was declared safe, yet another bomb threat was received.

As it turned out, five defendants were ultimately convicted for the bombing, which was contracted by another defendant who was attempting – unsuccessfully -- to destroy evidence in

a case before the court. The subsequent bomb scares were "copycat" calls.

Damage Control Strategy:

Following the flood, the county's disaster response team immediately responded, and the building was emptied of water, using two fire pumpers, by 10:00 p.m. Disaster recovery contractors were on site within six hours, and repairs and restoration of facilities began. Space heaters ran to dry out the area, and carpeting and wet wallboard were removed.

The bombing was a different story. Here the strategy was to resume control of the building as soon as possible once it was released as a federal crime scene the Sunday following the Thursday bombing. Communication with the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms agency, the FBI, the local police department and the county Sheriff's Office was crucial. In the interim, business critical processes were rerouted to the Fairfield Courthouse, all non-critical business was postponed, and most court staff were sent home.

Extent of Business Disruption:

After the flood, the damaged portion of the building remained closed to the public for four days while the building entrance was moved and the damaged portion of the building began to dry out. During that four days, court operations were handled in Fairfield. Emergency repairs to the damaged site allowed normal court operations to resume within one week, although it took a month to dry. It took about four months more for complete restoration, during

which court staff and construction laborers worked side by side.

Following the bombing, a disaster recovery contractor was engaged so that building repairs could begin once building access was permitted. However, business disruption continued, not so much in the Vallejo location as in the Fairfield location where multiple copycat bomb threats were received, requiring building evacuations and bomb searches. Tension ran high among judicial and court staff, as well as the general public.

Biggest Challenge:

The biggest challenge during the flood was the attempt to keep new computer equipment from getting wet. The issue following the flood was the clean-up afterwards, more particularly managing court operations in the middle of on-going repairs that lasted several months.

The first challenge after the bombing was determining what to tell people to do and how to tell them. Management met with court staff outside the bombed building and told them to go home and wait for further instructions. As logistics were dealt with, and critical matters diverted temporarily to Fairfield, it was time to address the threat to the Fairfield court.

In Fairfield, once the building was cleared, employees and the public were allowed building access, and the court's managers met to set strategy on next steps. At that meeting, the next threat came in. For more than a week, the court dealt with "copycat" calls.

Lessons Learned Following the Flood:

- Worked with emergency response team to create contingency plan for flooding;
- Modification was done to the canal to lessen the likelihood of future flooding;
- Established procedure to erect portable flood walls outside main entrance in critical weather pattern;
- Instructed employees on parking lot evacuation.

Lessons Learned Following the Bombing and Bomb Threats:

- Know your disaster recovery team and work with them on planning before the fact;
- Use the television and print media to get out the message you want them to convey - in this instance, that court business will resume and that intimidation is not effective.
- Work closely with Sheriff and Building Security to maintain bomb-threat protocol procedure.

Flooding in North Dakota Courts, 1997

Name of Court and Contact:

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Supreme Court of North Dakota

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Description of Court:

Five-judge trial court in Grand Forks, part of a unified system of state courts hearing cases ranging from small claims to felonies

Description of Event:

The entire city of Grand Forks was flooded in April 1997 when the banks of the Red River overflowed, flooding streets with 8-10 feet of water and causing fires that destroyed several buildings, including law offices. While no lives were lost, the entire city of 40,000 people was evacuated, with people fleeing to nearby towns and persons in convalescent centers moved sometimes to other states.

Damage Control Strategy:

Safety was the first concern. In collaboration with city and county government, the Grand Forks judges set up "court in exile" in Larimore, 20 miles west of Grand Forks within a day or two of the time the flood waters receded, having received emergency supplies of office equipment and furniture from the Supreme Court. Immediate attention there centered on people in the county jail, mental health commitments and issues surrounding constitutional rights. Less than a week after the evacuation, the Supreme Court issued emergency orders suspending the statute of limitations as well as orders concerning time limits, extending deadlines on procedural rules or statutes by 60 days for cases, parties and counsel in or around Grand Forks. Court was also set up in neighboring Nelson County, which was not affected by the flood. One of the judges held court in Lakota, while others rotated in Larimore. Once the University of North Dakota in Grand Forks was ready, judges set up court in their law school practice courtroom.

Extent of Business Disruption:

Lawyers had no files, not to mention no offices; what wasn't lost in the flood was destroyed in the fire. They were in no hurry to reschedule court hearings. Townspeople's priorities included finding family members, salvaging property and starting their lives over. The Supreme Court was in contact with the Governor and the National Guard, prepared to declare martial law to quell looting and rioting, had it proven necessary.

Biggest Challenge:

For eight to 12 hours, the Supreme Court had no contact with Grand Forks' judges. If phones worked, no one was there to answer them. From the

standpoint of the Supreme Court, the uncertainty of the whereabouts and welfare of judges and employees, the extent of the damage, and not knowing how to help from such a distance proved frustrating. No one knew where townspeople went. Radio stations broadcasted tirelessly, providing a means for family and friends to find each other. For long after, service of process was problematic.

Lessons Learned:

Know where your people are. Before something happens, ask the people who are most critical to court operations where they would go if they had to evacuate or how they might be reached.

Civil Unrest Affecting Los Angeles Courts, 1992

Name of Court and Contact:

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Calendar Management
Superior Court of California, Los Angeles

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Description of Court:

General jurisdiction trial court in major metropolitan area (10 mil. population, 4,000 square miles), with 563 judicial officers in 53 locations throughout the county.

Description of Event:

Los Angeles riots (1992) as result of unpopular verdict in a nationally-publicized 12-week criminal trial, with over 40 fatalities, destruction of

over 700 structures, thousands of arrests and tremendous property loss. While rioting, looting and burning took place immediately surrounding the downtown court complex, resulting curfews and confusion affected all courts within the county, including federal courts. The police station was surrounded, with police able to control station perimeter but less able to control the rest of the city. Riots lasted two to three days. Judicial emergency was declared during the riots, which suspended all time limits affecting criminal case processing. Jail was locked down. No inmates were moved. Thousands of arrests were made; charges were filed on roughly ten percent.

Damage Control Strategy:

While there were broken windows and bullet holes in the downtown courthouse, there were no break-ins or damage to the interior of the building. Downtown

court staff phoned previously-designated emergency call-in numbers to learn which other court locations to report to. Court calendared matters at the downtown location were held over until the following week. Using existing personnel, work that would have been processed at the downtown location during the 2-3 days of rioting was done by 105 criminal divisions throughout the county by suspending trials and extending court calendars until resumption of normal business in about a week.

Extent of Business Disruption:

All court operations in downtown Los Angeles were shut down for the two-to-three days of the riots, although cases were processed at other court locations. Concern over integrity of the court's central exhibit room -- which contained weapons, cash, jewelry, and narcotics -- was high, given proximity of riots. However, exhibit safety was uncompromised throughout.

Biggest Challenge:

Getting accurate information out to the public and to court employees. For example, the court had to continue to issue restraining orders even in the midst of the riots, and the people involved had to be told where to go. The local news radio was very cooperative due in large part to the good relationship with the

court's public information office. Local television was more interested in filming fires and looting and less interested in public service broadcasts. Newspaper coverage was inaccurate - applying information received from federal courts to all courts.

The court's automation systems would not allow filing a case in another jurisdiction. It took information technology staff to disable system edits to allow staff to override the system.

Lessons Learned:

Court staff in California know to prepare for natural disasters because earthquakes and the like are common; however, they have learned also to prepare for the unanticipated. The court now has a mass arrest plan for a complete shut-down of its information systems, off-site back-up for its essential data, and microfilm storage at a site separate from paper record storage. Planned prior to but implemented after the riots, California courts have reduced their risk for exhibit room safety in that now, by statute, law enforcement retains responsibility for storage of narcotics, with evidence admitted by photograph. In addition, there is a multi-agency Emergency Response Taskforce, chaired by a Superior Court judge, to review, update and coordinate all emergency response plans of affected governmental bodies.

The San Francisco Earthquake, 1989

Name of Court and Contact:

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Description of Court:

The court building houses 23 judicial officers in the criminal and traffic divisions of the superior court, the District Attorney's Office, the entire San Francisco Police Department, the criminal division of the Sheriff's Department, and some of the jails. This is a 24-hour operation for purposes of bail, court calendaring and arrest warrants although not for court proceedings.

Description of Event:

San Francisco is on an earthquake fault. In 1906, a lot of the rubble from the city's earthquake was used to fill in the Marina District (the Fisherman's Wharf area). In the Loma Prieta earthquake on October 17, 1989 (which measured 7.1 on the Richter scale), that landfill liquefied. In the Bay area, 68 deaths and over 3700 injuries occurred, homes and businesses were damaged and destroyed, with an estimated loss of between \$6 and \$7 billion. The court, ten miles away, experienced power outage for about 36 hours, affecting phone, elevators, computers, air conditioning, etc. Just as it had in the 1906 earthquake, the clock atop the Ferry Building stopped again: at 5:04 p.m. Silence in the aftermath was eerie.

See www.kron.com/specials/89quake.

Damage Control Strategy:

With cooperation among court, prosecutor and media, bail operations continued manually until such time as computers were operational. An emergency blanket order was issued, an effort to protect citizenry from looting.

Extent of Business Disruption:

Court closed only one day. Until power resumed, elevators did not operate, and

phones worked only intermittently. However, as soon as the facility was determined to be safe, court staff returned to work, conducting business through a manual process.

Biggest Challenge:

Because "political posturing" among elected officials might occur when the media is involved, it is essential to keep it to a minimum if efficient court operations are to resume.

Lessons Learned:

Plan for every eventuality, and then punt. Although current phone trees of staff representing critical functions are essential, and should be available in multiple locations, phone lines will be reserved for emergency personnel. Communication with court staff by phone may not be realistic. However, media contacts for public service announcements are invaluable. Know where the flashlights are.

Hurricane George and Puerto Rico Courts, 1998

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Description of Court:

The disaster affected all 13 judicial regions on the island and the 335 judges, staff and 150 buildings that comprise the court.

Description of Event:

Hurricane George struck Puerto Rico in September 1998.

Damage Control Strategy: Because the risk of hurricanes is very high, early in June each year court management directs a memo to all supervisors and staff with instructions on disaster preparedness. Instructions cover proper safeguard actions, supply orders from the general warehouse, and the communication system to be used during the emergency, e.g. broadcast station, newspaper, etc.

When the hurricane hit, staff was prepared to close the safe, shut the windows, keep the electrical equipment safe—and were prepared with an action plan to go into effect after the hurricane to result in early resumption of business operation.

Extent of Business Disruption:

Courts were out of service between one and two weeks, depending upon location.

Biggest Challenge:

Island-wide priority is resumption of electrical power to hospitals and other emergency systems. Until that could occur, the court was without power and without funds for electric generators or means to bring court services to the public.

Lessons Learned:

Three important lessons for future planning: First, new building design and construction requirements will take into account hurricane risk. Second, court staff is identifying where they are the most vulnerable and which of the utilities and facilities are most critical to their operation. And third, a study has been undertaken on the impact of erosion, landslide and drainage near court buildings.

APPENDIX A
Sample Disaster Scenario for Tabletop Exercise

OREGON JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT Y2K DISASTER TABLETOP EXERCISE
8/31/99

BACKGROUND

Throughout the month of December 1999 state agencies have been making final preparations for the turn of the century and anticipating potential Y2K problems that could occur and have an impact on their operations. So far, the weather has been typical for the month of December: windy, cold, rainy, occasional sunshine, and some snow at the lower elevations. River and stream levels have risen and there has been some minor flooding in parts of the state. The National Weather Service predicts this type of weather will continue through the first two weeks of January 2000.

The week of December 27-31, 1999, state agencies are completing final preparations for Saturday, January 1, 2000. Computer data has been backed up, and hard copies printed where needed in order to continue operations if computers fail. Paper forms, reports, and checks are available, ready for use, and staff has been trained on procedural usage. State payroll checks have been cut and, for those who use them, are ready for distribution on January 3rd. Direct deposit payroll was sent prior to the end of the pay period in order to insure all state employees are paid.

All bills have been paid that are in the financial system, and a hold has been placed on submitting and paying any additional bills until January 10th, allowing one week for any potential Y2K glitches in the system to be discovered and fixed.

All state agency staffs are expected to report to work on Monday, January 3rd, with no authorized personal leave scheduled for that week. Public safety agencies have established 24 hour continuous staffing for their offices and field activities.

DISASTER NARRATIVE

The weather has been typical for the month of December: windy, cold, rainy, occasional sunshine, and some snow at the lower elevations. River and stream levels have risen and there has been some minor flooding in parts of the state. The National Weather Service is tracking a large arctic blast of cold air that is expected to arrive in Western Oregon by nightfall bringing freezing rain, snow or sleet to the Willamette Valley floor. Snow accumulations of up to six inches are predicted. The storm will move toward central and eastern Oregon by the end of the weekend.

Friday, December 31, 1999

4:00 PST: Local and state amateur radio emergency services (ARES) operators begin monitoring radio broadcasts for potential problems as the year changes from 1999 to 2000 across international datelines.

5:00 PST: Most local emergency management agencies have activated their emergency operations centers in anticipation of potential Y2K problems. They are particularly concerned about public safety activities. The State Emergency Coordination Center has been partially activated and will act as the primary point of contact for collection of information and request for assistance from local emergency operation centers.

ARES operators begin receiving reports of rioting in Europe in various countries. Power and telephone outages are reported throughout most of eastern Europe and sporadically in western Europe. An airline crash, due to radar failure, has been reported at London Heathrow Airport with 400+ souls on board. A crash in the Eurotunnel has been reported with an unknown number of casualties.

9:30 P.M. PST: Cable news reports pockets of power outages throughout the eastern United States affecting over half a million people in six states. Customers overload local and long distance telephone systems from extensive use. As a result, local and state public safety agencies have issued a plea for citizens to limit their telephone usage to emergency calls only.

10:30 P.M. PST: The central part of the United States begins experiencing similar problems with limited power outages and jammed telephone systems. In anticipation of this, public safety agencies are providing emergency public information via the Emergency Alerting System. Police and fire agencies are conducting roving patrols throughout their area of assignment to insure emergency police, fire, and medical assistance is available immediately since 911 centers are overwhelmed with phone calls and phone lines are jammed.

11:45 P.M. PST: Lights flicker in Portland, Salem, Eugene, and Medford for several seconds.

11:55 P.M. PST: College towns report near-riot situations due to large numbers of Millennium parties. Several large groups of students have been reported to be roving outside of the University of Oregon. The Emergency Communications Center is receiving numerous calls from around the state of sewer treatment plant problems that are being aggravated by high rains, causing sewage overflows, several of which impact local drinking water supplies.

Saturday, January 1, 2000

12:01 A.M. PST: A computer virus called the "Millennium Bug" was triggered at 12:00 A.M. PST and private, public, and government computer systems were immediately attacked. State government computers, which were on-line at midnight, are having their data corrupted, computers are locking up, and systems are beginning to go off-line.

The state PBX system has gone off-line in Salem and Portland. Traffic lights in downtown Corvallis have shut off. Similar reports of traffic light problems are coming from Bend and Hood River.

A major power outage has occurred in the heavily populated areas of the Willamette Valley in western Oregon. Large areas of central and eastern Oregon report power outages. Downed trees along the coast have taken out numerous power and telephone lines. Major airports, including Portland International Airport, are affected by the power outages and are also experiencing computer failures in their FAA towers.

The Hood River Police Department reports that local power outages have impacted correctional facilities throughout central Oregon. Hood River and The Dalles Police and County Sheriff's Office report requests from Oregon Department of Corrections guards for additional law enforcement support.

1:30 P.M. PST: Power comes back on in some portions of western Oregon.

5:00 P.M. PST: There has been no civil unrest; however, because of problems with fire and burglar alarms, police and fire departments are stretched past their limits. An extraordinary number of defendants have been arrested, either for excessive celebration or for attempted breaking and entering. Power has been restored in most of the state.

Sunday, January 2, 2000

2:00 P.M. PST: High winds and ice on power lines have caused widespread power outages throughout eastern Oregon. I-84 is a sheet of ice. All passes are reporting whiteout conditions, heavy snow, and downed trees. The National Weather Service reports the storm is lessening in intensity. Major and local power outages are occurring statewide. Brownouts are occurring with greater frequency. Jails are so full that defendants are being released.

3:00 A.M. PST: A general alarm is sounded at the Umatilla Army Depot in eastern Oregon indicating a serious leak of toxic nerve gas. The media advises people to stay indoors and cover the windows and doors with plastic sheeting.

Monday, January 3, 2000

7:00 A. M. PST: The winter storm is over, and a weak sun rises in a cloudless sky. Much of central Oregon remains buried under two feet of snow. Power outages are still occurring statewide. Brownouts are frequent and of varying lengths, and many electronic devices are emitting low power alerts that continue throughout the day. Telephone service is erratic with most customers experiencing fast busy signals. Some municipalities are without water. Schools are closed.

8:00 A.M. PST: The Umatilla Depot alarm is recalled. The alarm was issued in error due to a non-compliant Y2K element in the alarm software.

QUESTIONS (Facilitated Discussion)

Part 1: Local Disaster Response Organizations - 10 minutes

1. Who is in charge of disaster response and recovery in your county?
2. Have you developed a working relationship with the person or persons in charge of disaster response and recovery?
3. How are the local representatives of other state agencies coordinating their disaster response and recovery efforts?

Part 2: Local Court Organization - 30 minutes

4. Where would you get your information about the disasters?
5. What security issues have you identified? How will you resolve them?
6. What problems do you anticipate for your court?
7. Have you identified mission critical functions? Have staff received training to maintain these functions? What happens if staff does not report for work?
8. Who will you need to notify? How will you notify them?

Part 3: Communications - 30 minutes

9. Will your service to the public be affected? If so, what will you do to lessen the impact?
10. If needed, how will you communicate information to the public, for example, that a trial has been set over? How will you communicate to your staff?
11. What informational messages (press releases), if any, would you want to release to the public?
12. How would you release the information?

Part 4: Wrap Up - 30 minutes

13. What are your top two to three issues and concerns based on the known information?
14. Are there any changes to your Disaster Recovery Plan you will need to make as a result of this table top exercise? If so, what are they?

APPENDIX B
Application and System Recovery Priorities

Every effort will be made to insure that critical applications and systems are recovered based on the following priority listing:

Priority 1 - To be recovered within 24 hours of a disaster declaration:

[list]

Priority 2 - To be recovered within 72 hours of a disaster declaration:

[list]

Priority 3 - To be recovered within 96 hours of a disaster declaration:

[list]

All other applications are priority #4 status and target recovery is within two weeks.

APPENDIX C
Recovery Tasks Guide

The last thing front-line systems staff have time for when in recovery mode is reading a lengthy procedures manual. However, a checklist - coded and prioritized - can be a useful tool in the recovery process.

Task Phases. The phases of recovery are:

- | | |
|--------------------------|---|
| Phase 1: Occurrence. | Initial response to an interruption of ITD data center services. |
| Phase 2: Activation. | Initiation of recovery plan activities. |
| Phase 3: Restoration. | Steps required to restore the system(s) at the HotSite or primary facility. |
| Phase 4: Reconstruction. | Steps required to repair or replace the primary facility. |
| Phase 5: Wrap up. | Steps required to return to normal operations. |

Task Code Naming Convention

- | | |
|-------------------|-----------------|
| Position 1 = | Recovery Phase |
| Positions 2 & 3 = | Primary Task |
| Positions 4 & 5 = | Secondary Task |
| Positions 6 & 7 = | Team Identifier |

- AA = All team members
- MG = Recovery Management Squad
- OP = Operations Recovery Squad
- DA = Damage Assessment Squad
- CM = Communications Recovery Squad
- SY = Systems Recovery Squad
- RS = Recovery Support Squad
- RP = Resource Pool.

Tasks for All Squads. Boldface type in the task description column indicates a task of primary importance.

Task ID	Task Description
10000AA	Disruption occurs at [court/department] Data Center.
10005AA	Determine severity of disruption.
10010AA	Follow Emergency procedures if applicable.
11000AA	Recovery Team Manager notified.
11500AA	Team Manager notifies CIO/[court/dept].

12000AA	Team Manager selects assemble point and notifies team managers and squad leaders.
12500AA	Recovery Services alerted.
13000AA	CIO/[court/dept] notifies senior management.
13500AA	Evacuate area or notify Security (phone number).
13505AA	Determine if a medical emergency or property damage exist.
13510AA	Evacuate area according to procedures.
13515AA	Notify Security of emergency situation.
14000AA	Handle medical emergency.
14005AA	Remove injured out of danger.
14010AA	Notify Security for medical assistance.
14500AA	Report property damage.
14505AA	Evacuate area according to procedures.
14510AA	Notify Security about damage.
14515AA	Notify a Recovery Team member and inform them of the situation.
15000OP	Shut down data center.
15005OP	If time allows perform orderly power down procedures.
15010OP	Notify a Damage Assessment Squad member and inform them of the situation.
15500DA	Initiate damage assessment activities.
15505DA	Contact all team members.
15510DA	Inform team of potential disaster situation.
15515DA	Instruct squad members to assemble at a secured location.
15520DA	Determine which vendors and local authorities will be needed to assist.
15525DA	Notify Recovery Mgt. Squad that assessment activities are in process.
15530DA	If needed assign additional members to support assessment effort.
15535DA	Obtain detailed information from site security.
16000DA	Notify vendors.
16005DA	Contact required vendors and arrange to meet at a secured location.

16500DA	Assess impacted facilities.
16505DA	Obtain permission to enter the facility.
16510DA	Assemble squad members and vendors.
16515DA	Perform a detailed assessment of damage to equipment, supplies and environment.
16520DA	Identify usable equipment, systems and applications.
16525DA	Create a list of all property needing repairs or replacement.
16530DA	Report findings to the Recovery Mgt. Squad on an hourly basis until assessment is completed. Estimate recovery timeframes.
17000MG	Determine recovery strategy.
17005MG	Evaluate damage assessment report.
17010MG	If recovery timeframes exceed outage tolerance levels, consider disaster declaration.
17015MG	Meet with senior management to review emergency situation status and determine impact to business processes.
17020MG	Obtain concurrence on appropriate emergency response and recovery alternative.
17025MG	Establish a process to ensure a timely and accurate flow of information.
17030MG	Activate emergency control procedures.
17035MG	Proceed to and coordinate appropriate recovery plan phase(s).
20000MG	Declare a disaster.
20005MG	Notify the recovery service provider according to procedures.
20010MG	Initiate full team notification procedures.
20015MG	Notify Risk Management and Finance.
20020MG	Notify vendors required to be positioned at the recovery site.
20025MG	Arrange for financing of recovery efforts.
20030MG	Coordinate media release details with Public Relations.
20035MG	Manage legal affairs.
20040MG	Manage insurance claims and adjustments.

20045MG	Authorize activation of mobilization and deployment procedures for all squads.
30000RS	Initiate command center and/or recovery support functions.
30005RS	Monitor and document recovery progress.
30010RS	Establish reporting schedule for all squads.
30015RS	Assign additional staff to squads where required.
30500RS	Notify recovery services provider(s).
30505RS	Contact hot/cold site provider.
30510RS	Contact equipment replacement provider(s).
30515RS	Contact emergency supplies provider(s).
30520RS	Contact salvage provider(s).
30525RS	Contact personal services provider(s).
30530RS	Arrange for transportation and lodging needs.
30535RS	Inspect cold site facility.
30540RS	Contact the offsite storage provider(s).
31000OP	Occupy the recovery site.
31005OP	Meet with recovery services support staff.
31500CM	Restore/install communications network.
32000SY	Restore operating system(s).
32500OP	Schedule production operations.
33000RS	Establish communications with clients.
33500OP	Restore production files, libraries and databases.
34000SY	Initiate system verification process.
34500CM	Activate network connections.
35000MG	Establish platform restoration priorities.
35500RS	Acquire additional equipment/supplies to support recovery efforts.
36000OP	Commence with production operating schedule.
36500MG	Schedule and coordinate move to cold site.

40000MG	Rebuild primary facility.
40500RS	Identify and contact required vendors and contractors.
41000DA	Assist with reconstruction efforts at cold site.
41500RS	Obtain and order equipment and supplies.
42000SY	Install and configure system operating environments.
42500CM	Install and configure network environments.
43000DA	Test safety and environmental control systems.
43500OP	Restore files, libraries and databases.
43600SY	Verify and test all applications.
50000MG	Schedule and coordinate return to primary facility.
50500RS	Notify all parties.
51000OP	Perform required backups.
51500DA	Prepare primary facility.
52000RS	Coordinate move from cold site to primary facility.
52500OP	Perform restores and resume normal operations.
59000MG	Critique recovery activities.

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